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ACTUAL MALICE: TwENTY-FlvE YEARS AFTER TIMES V. SULLIVAN.

By W. Wat Hopkins. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1989. Pp. xi,
215. $39.95.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1 the Supreme Court attempted
to protect media libel defendants by formulating the actual malice
rule. Under this rule, plaintiff public officials must prove knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in order to prevail in a libel
suit. As W. Wat Hopkins2 observes, however, "[twenty-five] years after Times v. Sullivan, much remains unknown about actual malice" (p.
x).
Hopkins' systematic study of the actual malice rule, Actual Malice:
Twenty-Five Years After Times v. Sullivan, attempts to discover some
of what "remains unknown about actual malice" (p. x) in three main
areas: (1) the history of the actual malice rule prior to New York
Times v. Sullivan (pp. 47-89); (2) the way lower courts define and apply the rule (pp. 133-59); and (3) the question of the rule's continued
viability in modem libel law (pp. 161-91). In addition, Hopkins supplies a thorough discussion of the facts and judicial opinions in New
York Times v. Sullivan, and a brief history of its progeny, providing
necessary background for a reader unfamiliar with libel law. Hopkins'
examination of the antecedents to the actual malice rule and his study
of how lower courts currently apply the rule make the strongest contributions to the existing literature. But Hopkins' proposals to reform
libel law fail to add much to similar recent proposals.
After describing the landmark Sullivan case (pp. 11-24), Hopkins
examines the antecedents to the actual malice rule - the common law
doctrines of the fifty states (pp. 47-89). Following the Sullivan decision, the Court received criticism for adopting the minority rule,
which protected false statements of fact made in good faith (pp. 7576). Much of the early commentary on Sullivan, in fact, focused on
the apparent adoption of the minority rule and paid little attention to
the actual malice rule itself (pp. 75-76).
However, Hopkins' examination of the pre-Sullivan case law of the
fifty states reveals that more states afforded some protection to false
statements of fact than did not (p. 76). In fact, twenty-four states provided some protection for false statements of fact, while only fifteen
states provided no protection (p. 76). (The remaining eleven states
were undecided (pp. 197-98).) This surprising discovery is perhaps the
most valuable contribution of Actual Malice. It indicates that Justice
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. W. Wat Hopkins is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute.
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Brennan had a much stronger foundation in the common law for the
actual malice rule than he indicated in the majority opinion (p. 86).
With this foundation in mind, Hopkins proceeds to examine Sullivan
itself.
Following a careful analysis of Justice Brennan's opinion in Sullivan (pp. 91-114) and a brief description of the Supreme Court's development of the actual malice rule over the past twenty-five years, 3
Hopkins summarizes his comprehensive study of how lower courts
have applied the actual malice rule (pp. 133-59). A Westlaw computer
search by Hopkins yielded nearly 1300 post-Sullivan cases where malice was mentioned in the headnotes preceding the case (p. 135).
Slightly more than 400 of these cases involved a determination of
whether actual malice existed (p. 135).
Hopkins' examination of those 400 cases leads him to conclude
that lower courts properly apply the actual malice rule (p. 152).
Although libel cases are fact-specific, making the boundaries of the
actual malice rule hard to determine, Hopkins finds that courts almost
uniformly follow "the guidance of the Supreme Court" (p. 152). In
addition, lower courts have filled gaps in the rule with near uniformity
(pp. 136-52). Hopkins' empirical :findings strongly dispute the common criticism that judges misapply the actual malice rule. 4
In the final chapter, Hopkins suggests some reforms for the law of
libel, adding to the "score[s] of other alternatives . . . suggested by
judges, attorneys, scholars, and journalists."5 Both plaintiffs and media defendants have sharply criticized the actual malice rule. 6 Plaintiffs complain that it is nearly impossible to win a libel suit of any kind,
while media defendants argue that the present system encourages frivolous suits, which cost the media large amounts of money to defend.
Public figures claim they cannot adequately protect their reputa3. Pp. 115-32. For discussion of the development oflibel law since Sullivan, see generally L.
FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT 60-70 (1987); W. OVERBECK & R. PULLEN, MAJOR PRINCIPLES
OF MEDIA LAW 76-122 (2d ed. 1985).
4. E.g., Brill, Redoing Libel Law, AM. LAW., Sept. 1984, at 1 (arguing that the actual malice
rule is frequently misapplied by judges).
5. P. 7. For analyses of some of the proposed reforms, see L. FORER,supra note 3, at 322-35;
R. SMOLLA, SUING TIIE PRESS 238-57 (1986); Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 847 (1986); Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to
Cumnt Libel Law, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 809 (1986). Statutory reform may be unnecessary; creative use of existing doctrine could solve the more common problems cited by libel plaintiffs and
defendants. See, e.g., Leval, 11ze No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper
Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988).
6. For discussion of the complaints of plaintiffs and defendants, see L. FoRER, supra note 3,
at 29-30; R. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 238; Barrett, supra note 5, at 857-58; Bezanson, 11ze Libel
Suit in Retrospect· What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 789 (1986);
Dienes, Libel Reform: An Appraisal, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 13 (1989); Franklin, supra note 5,
at 809; Kaufman, Trends in Damage Awards. Insurance Premiums and the Cost of Media Libel
Litigation, in THE Cosr OF LIBEL: EcoNOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1, 6-7 (E. Dennis &
E. Noam eds. 1989); Comment, Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited, 54 TuL. L. REv.
1053, 1087-89 (1980).
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tion because, as plaintiffs, they must meet a nearly impossible burden
of proof in order to prevail in litigation (p. 8). Public officials argue
that because their reputation for integrity is important to their posiw
tion, the inability to vindicate a damaged reputation impairs the funcw
tioning of government (pp. 8, 37). Most plaintiffs are unsympathetic
to media criticism of the actual malice rule because plaintiffs do not
vindictively desire to punish the media. A recent and prominent study
of libel suits discovered that, before filing a libel suit, most plaintiffs
first contact the media to request a retraction. 7 Most plaintiffs, then,
sue to restore their reputation, not to seek money damages.
Media defendants often complain about the costs of defending a
libel suit. These high costs, they argue, lead to selfwcensorship and, in
extreme cases, to the abandonment of investigative reporting (p. 35).
The root of the cost problem is the massive amount of discovery that
has been allowed in libel cases since the landmark ruling in Herbert v.
Lando 8 (pp. 30, 173). Herbert held that a libel plaintiff, in attempting
to prove a reckless disregard for the truth, may inquire into the state
of mind and editorial processes of the alleged defamer. 9 Ironically, by
setting such a high burden for libel plaintiffs, the Court's protection of
libel defendants has worked to the media's detriment, because the
higher burden of proof raises litigation costs substantially for both parw
ties. 10 Justice Black predicted this eventuality in his Sullivan
concurrence. 11
7. P. 37 (citing R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 5
(1987)).
8. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Herbert v. Lando itself provides an example of the massive amount
of discovery common under the present rules. One deposition of a television news producer
required 26 sessions and lasted over one year. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir.
1977); see also W. OVERBECK & R. PULLEN, supra note 3, at 110; Barrett, supra note 5, at 85758; Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, in THE CoS'r OF LIBEL: EcONOMIC AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 121, 143-44; Kaufman, supra note 6, at 8; Lewis, New
York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 603, 610-11 (1983); Garbus, New Challenge to Press Freedom,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 34.
9. Pp. 30-31, 173; see also c. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME CoURT AND LIBEL 97 (1981);
Case Comment, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Defamation Plaintiffs May Inquire
into Editorial Process to Establish ''Actual Malice" Under New York Times - Herbert v. Lando,
99 Ct. 1635 (1979), 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 31, 32-34 (1980). For general discussion of Herbert v. Lando, see Note, Herbert v. Lando: The Defamation Plaintiff's Burden of Proof and His
Access to the Editorial Process, 9 CAP. U. L. REV. 97 (1979); Case Note, Constitutional Law Herbert v. Lando: Advancing the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Standard Through State of
Mind Discovery in the Editorial Process, 3 GEO. MAsoN L. REV. 189 (1980); Note, Constitutional
Law - Self Censorship After Herbert v. Lando: The Need for Special Pre-Trial Procedure in
Defamation Action, 58 N.C. L. REV. 1025 (1980).
10. See Kaufman, supra note 6, at 8; Lewis, supra note 8, at 610.
11. 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black warned:
"Malice," even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and
hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent
protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up
to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.

s.

Id.
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In addition to prohibitive litigation costs, media defendants cite
two other problems with the status quo. First, they argue that the
legal system encourages lawsuits because a plaintiff can get legal representation on a contingency fee basis. 12 Second, defendants argue that
juries misapply the actual malice rule, even in clear cases, to the benefit of plaintiffs (p. 7). Misapplication of the rule13 leads to frequent
appellate review and, consequently, raises the costs of litigation (p.
175). Hopkins fails to draw one fairly obvious inference from this phenomenon: many juries, feeling that the actual malice rule overprotects
the press at the expense of innocent citizens' reputations, may return
verdicts which nullify the law.
Hopkins correctly observes that any change in the actual malice
rule must balance two major interests: (1) the protection of free expression and (2) the protection of an individual's reputation (p. 163).
The critical question is whether the current system properly balances
these interests and, if not, how it might do so. Hopkins first proposes
that the actual malice rule should remain the rule for public officials
(pp. 176-79). For other individuals, however, the rule should apply
only if the defamatory material is of "public concern" (p. 176). Thus,
for all plaintiffs who are not public officials, whether the actual malice
rule applied would depend on the type of speech, rather than on the
status of the defendant. Currently, "public figures," as well as public
officials, must prove actual malice. 14
Hopkins' proposal appears to make sense because the actual malice
rule seeks to protect free debate on public issues (pp. 176-77). In addition, classifying a plaintiff as a public or private figure presents a court
with one of the most difficult challenges in libel law. 15 The public
figure rule, however, assumes that any information about a public figure constitutes a public issue worthy of public debate. Therefore, application of Hopkins' rule may, in substance, produce outcomes
consistent with the current rule, because any statement about a public
figure could be considered to be of "public concern." If the new rule
produces outcomes consistent with the status quo, there is no reason
12. P. 38. But because most plaintiffs seek a retraction before filing suit, this criticism may
be predicated upon a misunderstanding of plaintiffs' motivations. True, plaintiffs can more easily
afford to bring libel suits due to contingent fee arrangements. However, a typical plaintiff files a
lawsuit only as a last resort. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. It is juries who misapply the rule. Trial judges generally apply the rule correctly. See
supra text accompanying note 4. Therefore, although summacy judgment motions and jury instructions usually reflect correct applications of the actual malice rule, jury verdicts may not.
Correct application of the rule by appellate courts, however, checks the mistakes of juries.
14. For a general discussion of the public figure doctrine, see C. LAWHORNE, supra note 9, at
47-57; R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 12-15 (1980); B. SANFORD, LIBEL
AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LmGATION 189-284 (1985); Bamberger,
Public Figures and the Law of Libel; A Concept in Search of a Definition, 33 Bus. LAW. 709
(1978); Comment, supra note 6.
15. See Skene, Expensive Speech (Book Review), 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 993, 999 (1987).

1418

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1414

to change the current rule. In addition, it is not clear that a court can
identify matters of public concern any better than it can determine a
plaintiff's public or private figure status. Instead of offering any basis
upon which courts could make this determination, Hopkins essentially
admits this difficulty: "Exactly what 'matters of public concern' are is
beyond the scope of this study" (p. 179). Thus, Hopkins fails to justify
shifting the focus from the status of the defendant to the subject matter of the allegedly defamatory material.
Hopkins also proposes a right-of-reply statute (pp. 182-86). This
proposal resembles one originally made by Marc Franklin. 16 Under
Hopkins' version, the potential plaintiff must submit evidence of falsity to the publisher and be refused a reply before initiating a libel
action (p. 184). If the parties cannot agree on a satisfactory reply,
then a libel suit may be filed. At trial, however, the plaintiff may only
introduce the same evidence of falsity previously presented to the publisher at the right-of-reply stage (p. 185). In every case, the loser pays
all legal fees (p. 185). Finally, if the press loses the suit, it may avoid
paying actual damages by publishing the reply after the trial (p. 185).
Hopkins does not adequately explain how this proposal improves
the present system. The problems created by the actual malice rule do
not necessarily require a statutory solution. In fact, the parties may
essentially attain Hopkins' right-of-reply system under the present
law.17 Because most libel plaintiffs seek a retraction before filing
suit, 18 the press already has an opportunity to avoid most libel suits by
negotiating with potential plaintiffs. Because a statute may needlessly
constrain the outcomes possible under such negotiation, there is no
reason to abandon the current rule. 19 The present system, under
which the press publishes a retraction on its own terms, should seem
less intrusive to the press than negotiated replies under Hopkins' proposed statute. Moreover, Hopkins fails to explain why a statute would
cause the press to publish replies when it can already avoid most suits
by the less intrusive mechanism of retractions. One possible explanation is that, under the proposed statute, a reply would preempt the suit
entirely. However, the parties can negotiate to avoid suit under the
present system.20 Thus, the press currently inflicts most of the eco16. Pp. 181, 184-85. For Franklin's original proposal, see Franklin, Good Names and Bad
Law: A Critique ofLibel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1983). See also Barrett, supra
note 5; Franklin, supra note 5.
17. See Leval, supra note 5, at 1298-301.
18. P. 37; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
19. It would be misleading to argue that there will be fewer libel suits if all plaintilfs are
forced to negotiate. It is the media defendants who refuse to negotiate, not plaintiffs. Moreover,
Hopkins' statute only requires negotiation, not settlement. Those plaintiffs who failed to seek a
retraction before the passage of Hopkins' statute would merely refuse to settle under the statute.
The statute, therefore, is unlikely to change the behavior of plaintilfs.
20. See Leval, supra note 5, at 1298-301.
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nomic damage on itself by stubbornly refusing to negotiate before suit
is filed. 21 Hopkins may be admitting as much when he suggests that
until such a statute is adopted, an ombudsman should negotiate with
potential plaintiffs and respond to their complaints (p. 186). Overall,
Hopkins fails to demonstrate that the goals of his proposal require a
statute, and that such a statute would change the litigious environment at all, inasmuch as media defendants are unlikely to print
retractions.
Moreover, Hopkins' proposal treats plaintiffs unfairly. Hopkins
admits that one valid criticism of the current system is that it inadequately protects the reputations of defamed individuals (p. 8). Hopkins' proposed statute makes it even more difficult for a plaintiff to
protect her reputation. Awarding attorney fees to the winner of the
suit discourages the very thing the statute was designed to encourage
- publishing a retraction. If the press knows that it is likely to prevail
ultimately on the merits in a lawsuit,22 it will avoid publishing retractions to send a message to future plaintiffs. By such action the media
defendant warns future plaintiffs it will litigate and win, and losing
plaintiffs will pay large legal fees. Only the richest of public figures
could afford to pay attorney fees when they lose a libel suit. Hopkins'
proposal not only provides a further weapon to the press - the threat
of large economic losses for trying to vindicate one's damaged reputation - it also takes away the very factor (the threat of large litigation
costs) which might encourage the press to negotiate before litigation in
the first place.
Hopkins' statute imposes further inequities on plaintiffs. First,
plaintiffs cannot use discovery to prove the falsity of information; they
must present their entire case to the defendant before filing suit. This
21. See L. FORER, supra note 3, at 33 (many criticisms of the media's arrogance are justified).
Professors Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski found that
[n]early all of the plaintiffs [in the empirical study] said that they were angered or dissatisfied by their contact with the media. Especially noteworthy is the vehemence with which
the plaintiffs described their reaction to their post-publication contact with the media. .••
Most of the plaintiffs told us that it was more than the rejection of their requests for a
retraction, correction, or apology that angered them; it was the way they were treated by the
media.
Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, The Economics ofLibel: An Empirical Assessment, in THE CoST
OF LIBEL: EcONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 22, 26. Bezanson, Cranberg,
and Soloski also note that the media admits that they are rude, arrogant, and do not handle
complaints well. Id. at 26-30; see also Nadel, Refining the Doctrine o/New York Times v. Sullivan, in THE CoST OF LIBEL: EcONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 157 (the
press deals unsympathetically, if not arrogantly, with potential plaintiffs). But see R. ADLER,
RECKLESS DISREGARD 15 (1986) (arguing that the media refuses to settle to protect journalistic
freedom and integrity). For a refutation of the latter position, see Nadel, supra, at 160 (refusing
to settle to protect journalistic freedom and integrity "seems to be mere rationalization").
22. Hopkins would retain the actual malice standard for suits involving matters of public
concern. Media defendants would therefore continue to prevail in high percentages. See, e.g.,
Kaufman, supra note 6, at 6-7. Moreover, we should keep in mind that most verdicts against the
media are overturned on appeal. The media's complaint is with the cost of the litigation, not
with their rate of success.
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provides an additional advantage to the defendant, who knows exactly
what evidence will be used at trial; the plaintiff does not know what
the defendant will use to refute this evidence. Second, the proposal
discourages prelitigation retractions because the press may avoid paying damages by printing a posttrial retraction. Because the defendant
already has such a high chance of winning a libel suit (about ninety
percent23), adding the ability to avoid paying damages when it loses
will encourage the press to avoid settlements.
Ultimately, Hopkins' proposal does not make much sense. His
goals can be accomplished under the present system, and his proposed
statute may operate contrary to those goals. Furthermore, the statute
provides additional protection for the press and unfairly punishes
plaintiffs. Instead of adopting Hopkins' proposal, we should maintain
the present system. The solution to the burden of libel litigation on
the press is readily available: media defendants may avoid suit by negotiating with potential plaintiffs. Instead of providing more rules for
litigation, the present system's disincentives to litigation should no
longer be ignored.
-

David G. Wille

23. R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, supra note 7, at 243; Dienes, supra note 6, at
13.

